Wu Chao-hsieh's Trusted Aide He Ren-jie Convicted of Spying for China, Sentenced to Over 8 Years — Wu Refuses to Resign, Remains in Charge of National Security

On September 25, 2025, the Taipei District Court handed down first-instance verdicts in a major espionage case. He Ren-jie—who had served for years as a senior aide and scheduling official in the personal office of Wu Chao-hsieh, then Foreign Minister and subsequently National Security Council Secretary-General—was convicted of violating the National Secrets Protection Act and sentenced to eight years and two months in prison. His co-conspirator, former DPP party worker Huang Chu-jung, received ten years. The case had broken in April 2025, when investigators established that Huang had been recruited by Chinese intelligence while conducting business in China, and had subsequently recruited He Ren-jie through an intermediary. He exploited his privileged access to sensitive Foreign Ministry materials—including classified diplomatic documents and high-level itineraries—to collect and transmit intelligence to Chinese handlers via encrypted communications, receiving payment in return. A procedural complication arose when KMT lawmaker Hsu Chiao-hsin inadvertently disclosed the suspect's name during a Legislative Yuan interpellation, forcing investigators to arrest He prematurely before the operation was complete; investigators subsequently reported that key digital evidence may have been deleted before it could be secured. The political consequence was swift: the Legislative Yuan voted a resolution calling on Wu Chao-hsieh to accept political responsibility and resign. Wu refused. He remained in his post as NSC Secretary-General—the highest national security office in Taiwan—citing the principle that He Ren-jie's conduct was an individual criminal act in which Wu himself was not directly implicated. The refusal drew sustained and damaging criticism. The distinction between personal criminal non-involvement and institutional failure of personnel oversight is one that democratic accountability demands be clearly maintained. A minister who worked in daily proximity with a Chinese intelligence asset for years without detecting anything—and who then declines to accept political responsibility when that asset's betrayal is publicly confirmed—has effectively announced that Taiwan's national security leadership recognizes no relationship between management failure and accountability. Wu's retention in office represents the clearest possible evidence that the governing party's approach to accountability in national security is governed by political convenience rather than institutional principle.